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‘Peace with a Capital P’: The Spectre of Communism and 
Competing Notions of ‘Peace’ in Britain, 1949–1960
Communism and Notions of ‘Peace’ in Britain
Nicholas Barnett and Evan Smith
University of Plymouth and Flinders University
This article is concerned with different factions within the British peace 
movement during the 1950s and early 1960s, each of which gave the word 
‘peace’ a different meaning. We argue that the movement was made up 
of several, often contradictory sections, and despite attempts by groups 
like the Peace Pledge Union to distance themselves from the communist-
controlled British Peace Committee, popular perceptions were tainted by 
association with communism until the mid-1950s. Following the onset 
of the H-bomb era, this taint lessened as people began to fear the 
destructiveness of hydrogen weapons. When the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament formed in 1958 it became the predominant British organi-
zation opposed to nuclear weapons and achieved popularity because it 
limited its objective to nuclear disarmament whereas the Peace Pledge 
Union demanded the condemnation of all war. 
KEYWORDS: Cold War, British Peace Committee, Communist Party of Great 
Britain, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, peace
During the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, the British peace movement 
consisted of several disparate groups with extensive ideological differences. 
Disagreements between communist and non-communist organizations, 
represented largely by the British Peace Committee (BPC) and the Peace 
Pledge Union (PPU) respectively, divided the peace movement. Both 
groups’ leadership of the movement was challenged by the formation of 
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in 1958. CND tried to 
answer its critics and hoped to unite its opposing components – secular and 
non-secular, communist, and non-communist. Eventually all sides of the 
fragmented movement worked together to pursue a single aim: ‘unilateral 
nuclear disarmament’.1 
This article is concerned with popular presentations of the British peace 
1 Frank E. Myers. ‘Dilemmas in the British Peace Movement since World War II’, Journal of 
Peace Research, 10 (1973), 81. 
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movement, particularly how it was depicted as being dominated by commu-
nists and the actual role of the Communist Party within it. Historians 
such as Phillip Deery and Weston Ullrich have examined some of the 
key moments when elements of the peace movement drew attention from 
the media or the government. Holger Nehring argues that the movement 
contributed towards a transnational community which attempted to find 
non-nuclear security within the Cold War division, whereas Jodi Burkett 
suggests that CND reached the British public with a somewhat patriotic 
message.2 By examining a number of popular newspapers from across the 
political spectrum, as well as the peace organization’s own publications, 
this article builds on these interpretations. We argue that popular depic-
tions of the peace movement’s relationship with the Communist Party of 
Great Britain (CPGB), and their actual relationship, evolved through three 
distinct phases during the 1950s, which are explored in the three sections.
The first period, from 1949, saw the CPGB agitate for nuclear disar-
mament using the label ‘peace’. However, it remained ambivalent towards 
other sections of the peace movement, such as the PPU, who campaigned 
on pacifist grounds. During this period popular media and public percep-
tions of the peace movement, informed by the anti-communism of the early 
Cold War, imagined that communists were subverting non-communist 
peace organizations and that the entire peace movement was tainted 
by communism. This article therefore explores how non-communist 
campaigners such as the PPU attempted to distance themselves from 
the communist-dominated organizations. The second period emerged 
following the US’s series of hydrogen bomb tests in 1954 and saw the peace 
and disarmament movements gain a degree of popular respectability as the 
communist taint faded. This period also saw renewed activism and increased 
collaboration between organizations. The third period, beginning with 
CND’s establishment in 1958, was characterized by attempts to overcome 
divisions within the peace movement. Agitation solely on the grounds of 
nuclear disarmament rather than pacifism helped CND to engage with a 
public that was still coming to terms with its awareness of thermonuclear 
weapons’ destructiveness. However, CND also tried to distance itself 
2 Phillip Deery, ‘The dove flies east: Whitehall, Warsaw and the 1950 World Peace Congress’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, 48 (2002), 449–68; Weston Ullrich, ‘Preventing 
“peace”: The British government and the Second World Peace Congress’, Cold War History, 
11 (2011), 341–62; Holger Nehring, The Politics of Security: British and West German Peace 
Movements in the Early Cold War 1945–1970 (Oxford, 2013); Jodi Burkett, Constructing 
Post-Imperial Britain: Britishness, ‘Race’ and the Radical Left in the 1960s (Houndmills, 2013).
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from the CPGB (and the CPGB from CND) until 1960, when the CPGB 
publicly announced its support for the programme of CND.
Anti-communism and the peace movement in the early Cold War era, 
1949–1953
Whilst the Communist Party was initially supportive of limited nuclear 
armament,3 during the Cold War the party began pushing for ‘peace’ 
between the communist and western blocs. For the CPGB, the meaning 
of peace was tied to the defence of the Soviet Bloc, and contradicted the 
notions of ‘peace’ and ‘freedom’ promoted by the United States in the 
‘cultural Cold War’ that accompanied America’s recapitalization of Western 
Europe. Initiatives, such as Radio Free Europe, acted as what Frances 
Stonor Saunders terms a ‘cultural NATO’,4 which voiced the idea that 
‘there can be no lasting peace until Eastern Europe has been freed from the 
domination of the Soviet Union’ and that ‘the increasing military strength 
of the free world … [was] designed for the purposes of peace’.5 
In the post-war era, the communist definition of ‘peace’ became tied 
to the prospects of multilateral disarmament. Moreover, as the Cold War 
progressed it increasingly focused on dismantling the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the continued disarmament of West Germany, 
as well as non-interference by the west in places such as Greece, Malaya, 
China, and Korea. In his 1952 exposé of the CPGB, ex-communist Bob 
Darke described the party’s position on peace in the new Cold War era:
the call for Peace, which had been more or less dormant on the Party’s 
cluttered platform, suddenly bounded into life … It began to appear more and 
more in Party propaganda. The Daily Worker began to print it with a capital P. 
It was top priority in all propaganda.6
One of the Communist Party’s key peace initiatives was the BPC, which 
formed in 1949. Its chairman was Communist Party member Ivor Montagu. 
An article in the CPGB’s weekly journal World News and Views on the 
3 See Malcolm MacEwen, The Greening of a Red (London, 1991), 133–8.
4 Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London, 
1999), 327–43.
5 Radio Free Europe, ‘Policy guidance memorandum no. 1’, 21 Sept. 1950, in Arch 
Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio 
Liberty (Lexington, Ky, 2000), 317.
6 Bob Darke, The Communist Technique in Britain (London, 1952), 143. 
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foundation of the BPC alleged that ‘active propaganda for a Third World 
War is being carried out by a handful of powerful privileged interests in 
America and Western Europe’ and that ‘[m]alice, fear and hatred are being 
roused against the Soviet Union’.7 The journal also called for ‘[f ]riendship 
between peoples of all countries and particularly of Britain, China, France, 
the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R.’, and claimed that the BPC ‘treat[ed] none 
as enemies except the instigators of war’.8 The BPC had an underlying 
pro-Soviet outlook. 
The PPU, by contrast, had been established by ‘progressive’ sections of the 
Church of England in the mid-1930s.9 Its approach in the late 1930s divided 
the group into those who broadly supported appeasement or ‘peaceful 
change’ and others who became disillusioned following the German 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938.10 In the 1930s the CPGB saw the PPU 
as pro-fascist – a sentiment later shared by others who depicted pacifists 
as ‘Friends of Hitler’.11 In 1938, the CPGB announced, ‘we have found it 
necessary to carry on a sharp ideological struggle against those tendencies in 
the Peace Movement who oppose collective security and seek reconciliation 
with Fascist countries, specially shown in the leadership of the Peace Pledge 
Union’.12 This animosity between the CPGB and the PPU continued into 
the Cold War era, with the PPU and their affiliated newspaper Peace News 
carefully annunciating their opposition to communism. 
During the early years of the Cold War, the BPC and PPU dominated 
Britain’s peace movement. Whilst mainstream media and politicians 
distrusted the PPU because of its stance in the lead-up to the Second World 
War, they were more concerned about covert communist agents within 
peace or disarmament campaigns and shared the PPU’s anti-communism. 
The BPC, as the British representative of the World Peace Council (WPC), 
justified some of the media’s association of the peace movement with 
communism because it had been principally established by the USSR. 
Moreover, as Gunter Wernicke has written, a number of other peace groups 
7 ‘Resolution of the British Peace Congress’, World News and Views, 5 Nov. 1959, 532.
8 ‘Resolution of the British Peace Congress’, 532.
9 David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge, 2008), 74–5.
10 See Lawrence Wittner, One World or None: The Struggle against the Bomb, vol. 1 (Stanford, 
1993), 84; David Lukowitz, ‘British pacifists and appeasement: The Peace Pledge Union’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, 9 (1974), 115–27; Martin Ceadel, Semi-Detached Idealists 
(Oxford, 2000), 358–75.
11 Daily Mail, 23 Feb. 1940, 6.
12 CPGB Central Committee, Report of the Central Committee to the 15th Party Congress, 16–19 
Sept. 1938 (http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sections/britain/
central_committee/1938/09/report.htm: accessed 23 Jan. 2014).
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across Western Europe refused to cooperate with the WPC,13 and a similar 
situation occurred in Britain.
During the early 1950s non-communist peace activists often found it 
necessary to emphasize their non-communist beliefs to the mainstream 
press. Peter Thompson, Vicar of Holy Cross, Hornchurch, clashed with 
his local scout troop after banning the national anthem because of its 
martial connotations. When questioned by the Daily Mail, he made his 
ideological position clear: ‘I am not a communist but a pacifist.’14 When 
media outlets referred to the actions of the BPC, peace was usually placed 
in inverted commas in order to make it clear that the word was being 
misused. One of the key promoters of this idea was Christopher Mayhew, 
Labour Cabinet minister and founder of Britain’s Information Research 
Department (IRD), who, when referring to the abandoned World Peace 
Congress of 1950, stated in the Sheffield Telegraph that ‘“peace” … meant a 
communist victory’.15 Reiterating Mayhew’s suspicion of the term ‘peace’, 
Prime Minister Clement Attlee referred to the BPC in Parliament in 
November 1950 as the ‘so-called British Peace Committee’.16 Nehring has 
argued that communist-led initiatives ‘discredited many peace campaigns 
and campaigners in mainstream political culture’.17 The meaning of ‘peace’ 
was debated by communists, mainstream politicians, and non-communist 
peace organizations alike. Early Cold War fears of communist infiltration 
combined with the negative connotations that pacifist groups had acquired 
during the Second World War meant that the PPU found it difficult to 
make its meaning prevail. When the mainstream media did cover the PPU, 
it was often reported as something of an oddity, such as when the Daily 
Express reported that a PPU meeting in Holborn was abandoned because 
organizers found that ‘they and the speakers were the only people present’.18
In 1950, the BPC was involved in two initiatives that prompted claims 
from the mainstream media and politicians that it was not working for 
‘peace’, but for Soviet-style communism. Firstly, the BPC campaigned on 
behalf of the Stockholm Appeal, a petition launched by the WPC in March 
13 Gunter Wernicke, ‘The communist-led World Peace Council and the western peace 
movements: The fetters of bipolarity and some attempts to break in the fifties and early 
sixties’ Peace and Change, 23 (1998), 270.
14 Daily Mail, 2 Apr. 1951, 5. For other instances, see Daily Mail, 4 Sept. 1950, 3; Daily Mail, 
26 Jun. 1961, 3.
15 Cited in Christopher Mayhew, A War of Words: A Cold War Witness (London, 1998), 81.
16 Parliamentary Debates (Commons). 480, 9 Nov. 1950, 1099.
17 Nehring, Politics, 32.
18 Daily Express, 25 Apr. 1952, 5. 
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1950. The BPC collected signatures from the British public supporting the 
demand to ban all nuclear weapons. The text of the appeal was brief, yet 
broad. Many anti-communists in Britain depicted the petition as a pledge 
of support for communism. The conservative historian Max Beloff warned 
listeners of the BBC’s European Service that:
The Stockholm appeal was not simply an appeal for peace; it was an appeal 
for peace on the Soviet terms; it was an appeal to accept the Soviet pattern of 
life for ourselves; because if we resist its imposition, force will be used, as it is 
being used elsewhere.19
Meanwhile, the PPU urged its members not to become involved with the 
Stockholm petition: 
Recognising the danger to peace in any confusion between pacifism and 
communism, and in attempts to avert a third world war being identified 
with pro-Russian sentiment … the National Council cannot assume that the 
word “peace” means the same to all who use it … Fundamental differences 
of principle make it neither possible nor desirable for the PPU as a movement 
to have any connection with the Communist party or BPC, and render it 
necessary to discourage members of the PPU from signing the BPC petition.20 
However, this official position was unpopular with many readers of Peace 
News, who wrote to the newspaper attacking the policy, prompting 
several weeks of defensiveness from the editorial staff.21 The leadership of 
movements like the PPU were attuned to the dangers of association with 
communism and sought to make their own meaning of ‘peace’ predom-
inate over that proposed by communists in Britain and abroad. Many of 
their activists, however, took a more pragmatic approach, believing that the 
peace petition was consistent with their own ends. 
Secondly, the WPC scheduled its 1950 congress in Sheffield. The 
potential arrival of members of a communist front organization caused 
anxiety for anti-communists in the Labour government and sections of 
the press. The government disrupted the Sheffield congress by denying 
entry visas to many foreign delegates, which made holding the event in the 
UK unviable and it was relocated to Warsaw.22 Some in the press thought 
that banning the entry of these foreign delegates was anti-democratic and 
19 The Listener, 1134, 23 Nov. 1950, 580.
20 Peace News, 30 Jun. 1950, 7.
21 See Peace News, 30 Jun. 1950, 6; 7 Jul. 1950, 6; 14 Jul. 1950, 6; 21 Jul. 1950, 6.
22 See Deery, ‘Dove flies east’; Ullrich, ‘Preventing “peace”’.
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potentially authoritarian.23 However, other popular newspapers, such as 
the Daily Mail, criticized the government for being too lax. The Mail asked 
rhetorically, ‘odd is it not that a government who propose to control the 
British people hand and foot cannot stop a lot of subversive aliens coming 
in’.24 The editorial continued: ‘No one wants to see our liberties infringed, 
but it may be necessary to take something from them to preserve them. 
That happened in the last war – and we are at war again, though they call 
it a Cold War now.’25 The Daily Mail amplified the threat of communism 
as part of the anti-communist moral panic witnessed in Britain during 
the early 1950s. The Mail criticized the Labour government for being too 
controlling, but overlooked this apparent self-contradiction as it called for 
stricter measures against communists. 
The Daily Mail’s comment angered part of its readership, some of 
whom wrote in condemning the actions of the government (and the Mail’s 
tacit support) for its non-liberal nature. One reader asked, ‘were they too 
frightened to allow these people to state their views publically?’26 Readers 
of the Labour-supporting Daily Herald also raised the issue of tolerance of 
‘abhorrent’ viewpoints and criticized the ban for betraying this British liberal 
ideal. A Labour councillor for Hackney, J.B. Cohen, wrote complaining that 
‘We had a magnificent opportunity of exposing the falsity of the so-called 
Peace Congress. Instead we have allowed ourselves to become instruments 
of the very things we as Socialists are fighting.’27 Cohen’s letter fits into a 
wider anti-communist narrative fostered by many in the Labour Party and 
amongst the readership of the Daily Herald that promoted tolerance as a 
British and socialist value. This supposedly inherent British/socialist value 
of tolerance was discarded by the Labour leadership during this incident.28 
The exclusions surprised many within the Labour Party. Despite a warning 
from Party Secretary Morgan Phillips that Labour Party membership and 
trade union affiliation was ‘incompatible’ with participation at the WPC 
conference, a number of Labour Party members travelled firstly to Sheffield 
and later Warsaw. Welsh Labour MP S.O. Davies expressed ‘disgust and 
resentment at the action taken by certain people in sabotaging [the WPC’s] 
original efforts to hold [its] gathering in Britain’.29 
23 John Jenks, British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War (Edinburgh, 2006), 120–4.
24 Daily Mail, 10 Nov. 1950, 1.
25 Daily Mail, 10 Nov, 1950, 1. 
26 Daily Mail, 16 Nov. 1950, 2.
27 Daily Herald, 14 Nov. 1950, 4.
28 Jenks, British Propaganda, 120–4.
29 Cited in, Noreen Branson, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain 1941–1951 (London, 
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Mainstream press criticisms of the non-communist peace organizations 
as being naïve and misled by communists remained common into the 1950s. 
The PPU was particularly concerned about this and was aware that their 
cause was threatened by frequent associations of their organization with the 
communist-led peace initiatives. Douglas Hyde, an ex-communist turned 
Catholic journalist, criticized the pacifist movement in the Catholic Herald, 
stating that the campaign of the BPC, led by the CPGB, had ‘puzzled, and 
in some cases deceived, many genuine peace lovers’. Hyde warned that 
the campaign was ‘timed and designed to aid the USSR, which stands to 
benefit so much by the disarmament of the West’.30 Believing that Hyde 
was talking about them (despite not mentioning them by name), the PPU 
issued a robust rebuttal in their journal Peace News, declaring:
We are Little Red Riding Hoods who cannot recognise the wolf in grandma’s 
clothing. We are dove-like harmlessness all compact, but of serpentine wisdom 
totally void … We are in short, well-meaning but uninstructed in the facts of 
life … The first thing to say about this charge of deception is that it happens 
to be incorrect. We know all about totalitarian tyranny. We are well up in the 
methods of the police state. We could pass a pretty stiff examination in the Sins 
of the Soviets. We have had first-hand evidence of some of the worst things 
done by Communist terrorism and we can confidently assert that, as far as our 
education is concerned we do not need to know any more.31
Denials such as this demonstrate that the leadership of the PPU became 
sensitive to the taint of communism and tried to convince the Peace News 
readership of the need to separate their campaign from communist-led 
organizations. 
The PPU also tried to engage with the general population to undo 
associations with the communist slant of the BPC and launched Operation 
Gandhi, a civil disobedience campaign against both nuclear weapons and 
Britain’s Civil Defence programme.32 In January 1952 they organized a 
sit-in protest at the War Office in Westminster, which resulted in eleven 
arrests. The protesters’ leaflet emphasized the PPU’s non-communist 
stance, stating:
We owe you an explanation. We are not crackpots and we are not communists.
We know we look silly. We are doing it to appeal to your intelligence and 
1997), 212–13.
30 Catholic Herald, 8 Jun. 1950, 8. 
31 Peace News, 23 Jun. 1950, 2.
32 Sean Scalmer, Gandhi in the West: The Mahatma and the Rise of Radical Protest (Cambridge, 
2011), 135.
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your conscience, although it may lead to arrest and imprisonment … We who 
give you this leaflet refuse to take part in war or violent struggle for either 
West or East.33 
The leaflet set out to disarm any potential accusations of communism and 
sought to regain ownership of the word ‘peace’ for non-communists. The 
protestors dissociated themselves from communism and simultaneously 
reasserted their opposition to armed conflict and the Cold War itself. 
The protest was largely ignored by the popular press, with the exception 
of the Daily Mail, which published a photograph of the demonstration 
and stated that the protestors claimed to be ‘non-political’, implicitly 
suggesting that the movement was untrustworthy. The Times dismissed 
the protest as merely an ‘[o]bstruction’.34 Throughout 1952 and 1953, the 
PPU conducted sit-ins at Mildenhall Airbase, the Aldermaston weapons 
complex, the Proton Microbiological Weapons Institute, and the Harwell 
Nuclear Power Plant.35 These protests were poorly attended, however, 
and on the few occasions when they received popular media coverage, 
they were generally depicted with suspicion, as the example of the War 
Office protest shows. 
Against a de facto bipartisan commitment to anti-communism by the 
mainstream media and major parties, the PPU and other non-communist 
peace campaigners attempted to write their own peace narrative. 
They disseminated their peace message through their leaflets and their 
newspaper, Peace News, and rhetorically disassociated themselves from 
the communists. However, the emphasis that newspapers tended to give 
to communist front organizations like the BPC, especially during the 
intensive anti-communism of the early 1950s, meant that the repeated 
insistence of the PPU convinced few that they were not communist 
agents, and their demand to stop all war preparation won little support. 
The turning point in the popularity of disarmament movements came 
with increased awareness of the potential destructiveness of thermonu-
clear weapons. 
33 Leaflet reproduced in Peace News, 18 Jan. 1952, 3.
34 Daily Mail, 12 Jan. 1952, 3; The Times, 12 Jan. 1952, 3.
35 Scalmer, Gandhi, 150–2.
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The push to unilateralism, 1954–1957
By the mid-1950s, there were significant shifts in public opinion concerning 
the prospect of peace. Moreover, concerns over nuclear weapons increased, 
which allowed the peace movement to grow. The US’s Castle series of 
thermonuclear tests began a new phase in the Cold War. The March 1954 
detonation of the Bravo shot, which was the first ‘pure’ hydrogen bomb 
and was then the most powerful nuclear weapon ever tested, intensified 
the arms race between the west and the Soviets. The explosions triggered 
concerns that any conflict might lead to worldwide devastation. Reports 
of the test in the news media produced what Dianne Kirby has described 
as a ‘revolution in public consciousness’ which was directed against nuclear 
armaments.36 A Gallup opinion poll exemplified this opposition in March 
1954, finding that 74 per cent of respondents favoured a multilateral 
agreement to ‘ban the atom bomb’, although 57 per cent believed that such 
an agreement was unlikely.37
The Daily Mirror ran a campaign to convince Churchill to renew attempts 
made in 1953 to convene a summit on easing Cold War tensions. In April 
1954 the newspaper asked readers to send their responses to the questions:
1. Should Churchill at once OPENLy INVITE Eisenhower and Malenkov to 
a conference on the H-bomb?
2. Should Churchill ask Eisenhower and Malenkov to STOP further H-bomb 
tests in the meantime?38
Within four days, 22,657 people had responded, 21,207 answering ‘yes’ to 
both questions.39 This reaction to coverage of nuclear destruction is a further 
example of the kind of success the popular press achieved in conveying 
what Adrian Bingham labels ‘the awesome magnitude of the bomb’, and 
helped to raise public awareness about the destructive potential of nuclear 
warfare in the mid-1950s.40 Public reaction against the new bomb was 
exacerbated by footage of the Mike explosion of 1952 broadcast on BBC’s 
Panorama on 13 April. This broadcast also featured the philosopher Bertrand 
36 Dianne Kirby, ‘Responses within the Anglican Church to nuclear weapons 1945–1961’, 
Journal of Church and State, 37 (1995), 614.
37 George Gallup (ed.), The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain 1937–75, 
Volume One: 1937–64 (New york, 1976), 320.
38 Daily Mirror, 2 Apr. 1954, 1.
39 Daily Mirror, 6 Apr. 1954, 1.
40 Adrian Bingham, ‘“The monster”? The British popular press and nuclear culture, 1945–early 
1960s’, British Journal for the History of Science, 45 (2012), 616. 
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Russell and the physicist Joseph Rotblat, who suggested that ‘the annihi-
lation of all life on earth is within the range of possibility’.41 The stoking of 
quite often apocalyptic fear within the mainstream media meant that more 
people became opposed to nuclear arms, despite the previous communist 
‘taint’. The increased public concern at the destructiveness of thermonu-
clear weapons encouraged more people to listen to activists’ messages and 
join those later 1950s peace initiatives which, Nehring argues, began with 
the establishment of the National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear 
Weapons Tests in 1956.42 This apparent ‘galvanisation’ of anti-nuclear 
activity was a continuation of the effects of the Bravo moment which began 
in March 1954.
Concerns about communist ‘taints’ and attacks on the peace movement 
lessened as mainstream anxieties about thermonuclear weapons circulated. 
There was an increasing sentiment that ‘something’ needed to be done. An 
editorial for The Times asked rhetorically:
Is peace possible? The hydrogen, after the atomic, bomb has amplified but 
not created the question; peace is popular … No government, one would 
suppose, whatever its side of the Iron Curtain can turn an entirely deaf ear 
to it.43
The editorial also lamented the previous association of peace with 
communist subversion because it discouraged peace initiatives. The peace 
movement was no longer automatically dismissed because of potential links 
to communism. But those who were sympathetic were often wary about 
the participation and methods of communists.
The Communist Party stressed that the testing of the hydrogen bomb 
had increased vocal opposition to nuclear weapons and strengthened the 
voice of the peace movement. The front page of World News on 10 April 
declared:
The widespread anxiety and anger of the people continues to mount. It was 
expressed by the many who lobbied their M.P.s on Monday night, and by the 
thousands who sent messages of protest and demands for action to the House 
of Commons.44 
This rising anxiety amongst the British population presented the CPGB 
and the BPC with the opportunity to exploit this collective indignation 
41 Manchester Guardian, 14 Apr. 1954, 12.
42 Nehring, Politics, 63–4.
43 The Times, 10 Apr. 1954, 7.
44 ‘The H-bomb and the EDC’, World News, 10 Apr. 1954, 282.
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and to influence the direction of the peace movement. The following week, 
World News announced on its front page:
Since the end of the war there has never been a time when such profound 
depths of feeling among the people were revealed as over the H-bomb. This 
feeling has been mounting at tremendous speed, as seen by the demonstration 
held in London during the week-end in response to the call of the British 
Peace Committee and the London Peace Foundation.45 
The CPGB now called for unity within the peace movement, saying that 
the ‘great need of the hour is that the efforts of all the peace forces should 
be united and that campaigns … should be of an all-inclusive kind’.46 
The campaign against the H-bomb became a key component of the 
Communist Party’s and the BPC’s peace campaigning in the mid-1950s. 
As Willie Thompson wrote, the peace movement was central to the party’s 
programme in the 1950s as it ‘link[ed] together all its international concerns 
in terms of both security for the Soviet bloc and objection to what Western 
military forces were doing to Third World peoples’.47
The Communist Party’s press warned that campaigns that did not 
embrace unity amongst peace campaigners would ‘not only fall far short of 
their immediate aims, but will make no lasting contribution to the cause 
of peace’.48 However, the party did not always follow its own advice and, 
at times, resisted initiatives made by other peace groups whose notion of 
‘peace’ was not directly tied to a desire to ‘protect’ the Soviet Bloc from 
western attack. An example of this was the party’s relationship with the 
Hydrogen Bomb National Campaign (HBNC), which was launched by a 
group of one hundred Labour MPs following the outcry over the Castle 
hydrogen bomb explosion. The HBNC drew up a petition, circulated 
nationwide, calling for the British government to renounce H-bombs 
and to refuse to allow Britain to host American airbases.49 Eventually the 
petition gathered 750,000 signatures that were delivered to Parliament. 
Kate Hudson suggests that this example of Labour Party-led activism was 
an important precursor of the formation of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament in 1958.50 However, the HBNC received little support from 
45 ‘The people v the H-bomb men’, World News, 17 Apr. 1954, 301.
46 ‘The people v the H-bomb men’, 302.
47 Willie Thompson, The Good Old Cause: British Communism 1920–1991 (London, 1992), 98. 
48 ‘The people v the H-bomb men’, 302.
49 Manchester Guardian, 8 Apr. 1954, 16.
50 Kate Hudson, CND: Now More than Ever (London, 2005), 37–9.
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others in the peace movement, including the CPGB: the Daily Worker gave 
the campaign no coverage in its pages.
Other peace campaigners were also critical of the HBNC. The PPU 
argued that the abolition of hydrogen bombs was not enough and that the 
only answer was the total disarmament of all weapons. With spokespersons 
Sybil Shepherd and Stuart Morris leading the group’s opposition, the PPU 
stated:
Under the circumstances we feel that we have no option but to discourage 
pacifists from taking part in the ‘hydrogen bomb – national campaign’ and to 
urge them instead to throw all their energies in[to] … making clear the pacifist 
answer to the situation by emphasising the moral issue …, not by signing an 
inadequate petition but by signing the pledge to renounce war.51
Disagreement within the peace movement suggests that, even when people 
were increasingly aware of the threat posed by greater destructive power, the 
movement remained divided between ideologically opposed factions whose 
different belief systems made it difficult to unite around a common aim. 
Despite popular misconceptions, the peace movement was not controlled by 
the Communist Party, which was equally very wary about certain sections 
of the peace movement. The HBNC was an attempt by some Labour MPs 
to force the Conservatives to pursue international nuclear agreements. It 
was also an attempt to maintain the initiative on nuclear arms control that 
many in the Labour Party, including Coventry East MP Richard Crossman, 
believed that their party had achieved by placing sustained pressure on the 
government during March and April 1954.52 Furthermore, the campaign 
aimed to promote Labour’s leadership of the peace movement, but both 
the communist-led BPC and the PPU were apprehensive about this parlia-
mentary initiative. 
Coinciding with the growing popularity of peace movements, the 
Labour-led Coventry City Council refused to implement its statutory 
Civil Defence commitment and informed the Home Secretary, Sir David 
Maxwell Fyfe, that: 
In view of recent reports in regard to the explosion of the hydrogen bomb 
and its devastating effects, [we] inform the Home Secretary that it is a waste 
of public time and money to carry on with the Civil Defence Committee: 
therefore it is the Council’s intention to take steps to terminate its existence.53 
51 Peace News, 23 Apr. 1954, 5.
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The announcement showed that the councillors thought the new nuclear 
weapons had radically diminished the possibility of any form of defence. 
The action allowed opponents of Coventry City Council and Labour to 
express their concerns that Labour’s left was being unduly influenced by 
the CPGB.54 Coventry City Council’s decision to disband its Civil Defence 
committee went against the national Labour Party’s directives and the 
council was criticized by both the Conservatives and sections of the parlia-
mentary Labour Party.55 However, several Labour-controlled local councils 
supported Coventry and suggested that they might follow suit (although 
none actually did).56 Following Coventry City Council’s protest against a 
Civil Defence exercise held in the city on 31 May, a number of critics made 
associations between Coventry’s actions and communism, and accused the 
council of being sympathetic to the Soviet Union. For example, Gilbert 
Richards, a Conservative councillor in Coventry, argued that this move 
would ‘bring gladness only to those behind the iron curtain’ and the News 
Chronicle accused the council of copying ‘a theme song from Moscow’.57 
Whilst Coventry’s decision to jettison its Civil Defence commitments 
tapped into the public’s fear of thermonuclear weapons and the potential 
devastation of the hydrogen bomb, the taint of communism persisted 
and Nick Tiratsoo has noted that local Conservatives and Liberals were 
quick to associate Labour with Moscow during the 1955 general election 
campaign.58 
Whilst Coventry’s City Council was led by a Labour Party majority, it 
was praised by the CPGB for its decision regarding Civil Defence, which 
right-wing critics used to suggest associations between the two. Whilst still 
a CPGB member, Fire Brigades Union official John Horner congratulated 
the council for its ‘magnificent stand for peace’.59 In an editorial for Labour 
Monthly, the Communist Party’s R. Page Arnot wrote that ‘the futility of 
the Home Office’s “Civil Defence” has been strikingly exposed’ and that 
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the Coventry Labour Party had demonstrated that ‘the only defence against 
total destruction is to prevent the use of the hydrogen bomb’.60 In an open 
letter to Fyfe, the Secretary of the BPC and Daily Worker staffer William 
Wainwright commended Coventry for its stance, stating: ‘Coventry’s 
decision is making history. May we hope that you will respond to its appeal 
to work for the abolition of all weapons of indiscriminate slaughter?’61 
Whilst Coventry’s councillors were frequently accused of ignoring the 
communist threat, communists applauded them and frequently sought to 
capitalize on nuclear anxieties.
Throughout the mid-1950s, the issue of nuclear weapons remained 
contentious, particularly during the general election of 1955 and then again 
during the crises of late 1956 – the Hungarian uprising and the Anglo-
French-Israeli invasion of Suez. The fear that international conflict might 
spark a nuclear war resulted in the emergence of a popular movement 
against nuclear weapons. This concerned the Conservative government, 
which attempted to contain nuclear anxieties. Peter Goodwin suggests 
that the Conservatives were particularly worried about the new media 
presence of television and scrutinized the BBC for its coverage of nuclear 
and peace issues, writing that they ‘directly and indirectly ensured that the 
BBC downplayed the dangers of the bomb’.62 During this phase, peace 
became more popular as there was a growing realization of the dangers 
posed by nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, the peace movement became 
more diverse with the growth of many non-communist organizations. 
Having dominated the peace movement in the early 1950s, the BPC was 
still one of the largest peace organizations in Britain, but its influence was 
challenged by other non-communist organizations. In the late 1950s, a new 
organization with a broad appeal further threatened the dominance of the 
BPC – the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. CND’s formation was to 
cause consternation amongst Britain’s communists, who zigged and zagged 
in their approach towards the new organization.
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CND and Britain’s first mass disarmament movement, 1957–1960
In November 1957 the New Statesman published J.B. Priestley’s article 
‘Britain and the Nuclear Bombs’, which discussed how the Soviets’ 
launch of Sputnik would increase nuclear competition.63 Priestley’s article 
spurred a number of activists (such as Bertrand Russell, Michael Foot, and 
E.P. Thompson) into action and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
was formed in February 1958. The original aim of CND was, as Mark 
Phythian wrote, ‘a short, concerted campaign to inform and win over 
public opinion and the Labour Party … to the wisdom of unilateral UK 
renunciation of nuclear weapons as a first step towards world disarmament’.64 
CND’s limited objective gave it an advantage when compared to the PPU, 
which demanded an end to all armaments nuclear and conventional. 
Increased public awareness of the effects of nuclear weapons and a desire 
for some kind of limitation on proliferation on an international scale meant 
that CND capitalized on the development of broader concerns about 
nuclear war. Furthermore, the campaign brought differing ideological 
groups, including members of the PPU, Operation Gandhi, Labour Party 
activists, and later trade union activists and the communists, together to 
pursue unilateral nuclear disarmament. This led to several disagreements 
within CND over its direction, but also meant that some pre-existing 
groups were wary of the organization.
The PPU had a problematic relationship with CND. A statement in 
Peace News suggested that the problem was CND’s refusal to promote the 
abolition of all armed forces:
While … sympathising with the concern of those who are demanding unilateral 
disarmament of nuclear weapons, the PPU confidently asserts that the only 
effective answer lies with those who are committed to all the implications for 
total peace and the complete renunciation of war itself. It is that answer which 
the PPU must continue to give clearly and without compromise if those who 
now feel unable to accept the full pacifist position are to be helped to see the 
logical conclusion of their demands and to accept the personal responsibility of 
renouncing war itself and urging unilateral total disarmament.65 
The PPU’s approach was consistent with its pacifism: it asserted that anti-
nuclear campaigns were inadequate and campaigned for total conventional 
63 J.B. Priestly, New Statesman, 2 Nov. 1957, 556.
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disarmament. The memory of the Second World War was relatively fresh 
and coverage in the press had stoked fears around thermonuclear conflict, 
which meant that the PPU’s stance had marginally stronger appeal than 
CND’s. Moreover, it was typical of the PPU’s reluctance to cooperate with 
other groups in the peace movement – a position that proved detrimental to 
the PPU itself (as well as the wider movement) as CND rose in prominence. 
CND had won support by focusing on the horror that could be caused by 
thermonuclear conflict, while the PPU denounced all war preparation and 
advocated complete disarmament by the British. In the era of the Cold War, 
opposition to nuclear weapons grew (a Gallup Poll in May 1958 suggested 
that 30 per cent approved of unilateral British nuclear disarmament), but 
there was little public appetite for total conventional disarmament.66 
Dominic Sandbrook has asserted that the Cold War was generally absent 
from British daily concerns, proposing that the public felt a general indif-
ference to international politics.67 Nevertheless, reportage of flashpoints 
such as the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the Suez crisis, and the nuclear 
arms race made the Cold War conflict impossible to ignore and during 
the late 1950s, anti-nuclear activists encouraged people to think about the 
international situation.68 However, as the May 1958 opinion poll and lack 
of press support for CND’s position suggest, unilateral disarmament was not 
overwhelmingly popular. Much of the popular press treated the unilateralist 
approach of CND with contempt or downplayed their early activities, but 
the first Aldermaston march during Easter weekend of April 1958 changed 
this media outlook.
The first march from London to Aldermaston was the expansion of a 
march planned by the Direct Action Committee, a pacifist organization 
linked to the PPU and Peace News, but was subsequently dominated by 
CND.69 The press could not easily dismiss over ten thousand marchers.70 
Despite not supporting CND’s objectives, the Daily Mirror congratulated 
the organization on its principled stand:
The Mirror salutes the Aldermaston marchers. Blistered feet and all … 
Everybody wants to get rid of the bomb. The argument is the best way to do 
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it … This newspaper has made it clear that it thinks the Aldermaston marchers 
are on the wrong tack.
But at least they UPPED and DID something.71
As the newspaper with the largest circulation in Britain at the time, the 
attention that the Mirror gave CND was vital in disseminating its ideas 
to the wider British population. At the same time, however, the newspa-
per’s staff expressed concerns about the organization. The opinion writer 
‘Cassandra’ expressed unwillingness to embrace unilateral nuclear disar-
mament, but applauded the marchers:
[T]he fact that hundreds of people, no matter how misguided, are prepared 
to tramp through the streets and the lanes for four days of acute discomfort 
shows that the people of this country are deeply uneasy at the nuclear perils 
that now surround them.72
Meanwhile, the Daily Herald followed a similar line, declaring: ‘We may 
not agree with all they are marching for but at least … they have acted for 
their beliefs’.73 Roy Greenslade suggests that these headline articles angered 
Labour Party leaders, but that they pleased the ‘vast majority’ of the Herald’s 
readership.74 Therefore, newspapers engaged with broader anxieties over 
the threats posed by nuclear proliferation. Moreover, whilst press opposition 
to nuclear weapons indicated their desire for international agreement, they 
also suggested that a mass movement against nuclear weapons, rather than 
simply a pacifist movement, reflected many people’s concerns.
CND’s emergence coincided with broader anxieties about the nuclear 
arms race and the increased destructiveness of the new generation of 
weapons since 1954. The movement rapidly grew beyond its organizers’ 
expectations.75 Bingham has found that the popular press was often alarmist 
about the nuclear issue, with newspapers applying labels like the ‘horror 
bomb’ to thermonuclear weapons.76 The emergence of a mass nuclear 
disarmament movement further demonstrates Bingham’s argument that 
the scale of coverage given to nuclear weapons helped to form opinions 
about the arms race. By engaging in large-scale evocative protests, such 
as the Aldermaston march, CND expanded on concerns about nuclear 
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proliferation, which had begun in the popular press. Whilst the popular and 
usually Labour-supporting press did not necessarily support CND’s aim of 
unilateral disarmament, it accepted that nuclear weapons were terrifying 
and that peace must become a political priority. CND’s position often 
followed more widespread concerns and it was able to utilize this popular 
support for the reduction of nuclear tensions unlike the PPU, which 
demanded the total renunciation of war. 
But other, possibly more conservative, newspapers were less favourable 
towards CND and reported communist infiltration of the movement. 
The Daily Sketch claimed that the CND leadership was absent from the 
Aldermaston march and that the rank-and-file protestors were naïve, 
allowing ‘about 2000’ communists to take over the march.77 The politically 
liberal News Chronicle’s Frank Barber similarly implied that the Aldermaston 
marchers were mainly communist, but this sparked a number of letters 
from readers criticizing the journalist.78 This press representation contrasted 
with the government’s own intelligence reports which, after careful inves-
tigation, concluded in 1959 that ‘the communists have not at all penetrated 
the CND at national level’ and that ‘[t]he Communist Party does not 
support the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament’.79
Some right-wing newspapers were also concerned that the appeal of 
CND was expanding to non-traditional peace activists, such as the suburban 
middle class. Writing in the Daily Mail, Alan Brien stated that for every 
communist attending the march, ‘there were a hundred respectable private 
persons from semi-detached houses with tradesmen’s entrances who … 
wished to show their uneasy concern for tomorrow’.80 Nehring uses the Daily 
Mail’s coverage of the 1958 Aldermaston march to demonstrate the paper’s 
conservative values and ‘dislike’ of the middle class, which could presumably 
be interpreted as an anti-intellectual position.81 But as Judy Giles points out, 
the Daily Mail was also seeking to attract the aspirational middle class, which 
formed a significant section of its readership.82 Its coverage might therefore 
have been reflecting on the similarities between the usual leisure pursuits of 
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the middle class and engaging in popular concerns about nuclear weapons. 
CND aimed to appeal to a cross-class base, but drew much of its support from 
Britain’s aspiring middle classes and echoed the concerns of many ‘ordinary’ 
people who made up the readership of newspapers such as the Daily Mail.83 
The articles therefore reflected a common concern over nuclear weapons 
shared by newspaper and readership, rather than a criticism of the campaign’s 
middle-class membership. Street activism and opposition to nuclear arms 
was not always attacked outright – a testament to how far the British peace 
movement was interacting with the popular consciousness by the late 1950s. 
Whilst some contemporaries were concerned that CND was being 
infiltrated by communists, scholars investigating the British left have long 
contended that the CPGB was hostile towards CND because it threatened 
the BPC’s dominance over the peace movement. Since the 1970s, a number 
of scholars have argued that the CPGB were opposed to CND in its initial 
years, with Willie Thompson explaining:
In the first place it had seen the new movement as a distraction from what was 
really important, namely disarmament negotiations between the Great Powers 
… The second reason for the party’s suspicion was that the Campaign was 
seen as a potential rival to its own front peace organization, the British Peace 
Committee …84
Nevertheless, other scholars have argued that the attitude of the Communist 
Party towards CND (and the peace movement more generally) was more 
ambivalent. As Roger Seifert and Tom Sibley have written, the ‘main 
efforts [of the party] were directed toward the peace campaign’ in the 1950s, 
but always on the multilateral platform of banning all nuclear weapons.85 
Richard Taylor has also stated that, ‘Contrary to popular opinion both 
inside and outside CND, the Daily Worker had given considerable coverage 
to Peace Movement activities prior to the formation of CND.’86
Throughout the 1950s, the focus of the Party’s peace activism was the 
BPC, with which it encouraged trade unions to affiliate. On paper, the 
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Party ‘pledge[d] its support to the efforts of all peace organizations’,87 but as 
mentioned above, it was actually quite reluctant to work with other peace 
organizations, such as the PPU. This did not really present a problem while the 
BPC was probably the most organized peace group in the country. However, 
the emergence of CND was a problem that the CPGB had to negotiate. 
As Richard Taylor has written, one of the major disagreements between 
the CPGB and CND was the latter’s policy of unilateral disarmament.88 
The Party’s Assistant Secretary George Matthews criticized the CND 
policy of unilateralism for being too ‘liberal’ and ‘defeatist’, and argued that 
‘even if what the unilateralists propose were to become Government policy, 
it would not solve the problem of the H-bomb, since American and Russian 
H-bombs would remain’.89 Instead of focusing on unilateral disarmament, 
Matthews proposed that the peace movement should concentrate on inter-
national disarmament agreements between the superpowers: ‘the best way 
to rally the people to secure the banning of the bomb by Britain and all 
other countries, is to concentrate on the fight for international agreement’.90
The CPGB was also concerned that CND had not integrated itself 
into the labour movement and risked splitting the peace movement. A 
draft resolution written by the Communist Party’s Political Committee 
showed that the Party was worried that right-wing elements in the labour 
movement would manipulate this difference ‘to divide the peace forces’.91 
To counter this, the CPGB declared:
Congress therefore appeals to all sections of the peace movement in Britain, unilat-
eralists and non-unilateralists, to unite in a supreme effort to this end. It appeals 
for the unity of the peace movement and the Labour movement for these aims.92
Some Communist Party members questioned whether it was more strategic 
to get the organized labour movement to agitate for peace, rather than the 
Party cooperating with peace organizations, particularly as many trade 
unions were still wary of CND.93 
The CPGB’s Executive Committee commended CND for bringing 
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‘many from the professional and middle sections of the population’ into the 
peace movement, but warned:
Its weakness has been that its leaders have held themselves aloof from the 
organized Labour movement, have often taken up an ‘anti-political-party’ 
attitude, have tried to impose bans and proscriptions, and have emphasised the 
issue of unilateral nuclear disarmament in a way which has tended to divide 
rather than unite the forces for peace.94
The CND’s ‘“anti-political-party” attitude’ which the CPGB found 
distasteful helped the campaign to gain support. Its ability to steer clear 
of association with communism allowed it more respectability in British 
society. The Party, while using supportive language in regard to CND, still 
believed that the BPC fulfilled a role in the peace movement that no other 
organization could. The Executive Committee stated:
It is an organization trying to conduct continuous activity for peace, on all the 
major international issues, and not engaging in only spasmodic campaigning 
on particular questions [and also] … recognises the key importance of winning 
the organized Labour movement into action for peace …95
By mid-1959, antagonism between the CPGB and the TUC increased 
as it seemed that the latter was looking to support CND, rather than the 
BPC. The CPGB alleged that the ‘General Council of the TUC and the 
top leadership of the CND have both advised against support’ for a ‘March 
for Life’ demonstration organized by the BPC.96 In July 1959, the CPGB 
acknowledged the Aldermaston march as one of a number of events that 
showed ‘the widespread alarm at the nuclear dangers’ amongst the British 
public, but still supported the ‘March for Life’ demonstration.97
Richard Taylor suggests that this antagonism coincided with a change of 
heart by the CPGB towards unilateralism as the labour movement warmed 
to CND, which appeared to be building serious opposition to the Labour 
Party leadership’s position.98 Taylor quotes George Matthews, who reflected 
on this tactical shift in 1978:
Around the middle of 1959 we came to the conclusion that whether or not we 
had been right earlier on about the issue of unilateralism … the situation had 
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developed as far as public opinion, and opinion in the Labour Movement, was 
concerned where the issue was combining the two: that is, calling for Britain 
to renounce the Bomb as a step to international agreement.99
By 1960, the positions of CND and the CPGB had aligned. That year’s 
Aldermaston march was celebrated by the Communist Party press, the 
Daily Worker featuring a sizeable article on ‘Why They’ll March from 
Aldermaston’. Although the CPGB had previously agitated for a greater 
trade union presence within the peace movement, it now applauded the 
diversity of those marching:
When this Easter the thousands – pretty girls and young men, at once sober 
and gay, mothers with prams, and fathers piggybacking Joan and John; Labour, 
Liberal and Communist, Quaker, Jew and Nonconformist, Indian, West Indian 
and African – make their pilgrimage, it will be not just in protest against the 
boffins of death at the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Research establishment.100
In the months following the Aldermaston march, the communist journal 
Labour Monthly published two articles by CND representatives, one by 
Anna Steele (Secretary of CND’s London Regional Council) and one by 
S.R. Broadbridge (Treasurer of CND north-west region), which demon-
strated the Party’s shift towards openly embracing the Campaign.101 The 
article by Broadbridge was important because it tacitly acknowledged the 
previous disagreement between CND and the CPGB (and the BPC):
Since the foundation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament there have 
been two organizations working for peace in Britain, with differing policies 
and appealing to different sections of the public. It has become increasingly 
clear recently that this benefits none but the opponents of international 
agreement and that only a united effort can force success in the many negotia-
tions at present in progress.102 
But the article now commended the united efforts of the two campaign 
groups, stating ‘we are not rivals’, although it reminded readers that ‘Not 
all C.N.D. supporters have lost their hesitations over cooperation, [and] not 
all trade unions have ceased to believe that C.N.D. is a set of middle class 
cranks.’103 Long-time Party member Arnold Kettle praised the ‘wide and 
enthusiastic participation of progressive middle-class people, and particularly 
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students and young people, in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and 
the Aldermaston marches’, but also clarified that these marches were ‘not, 
in any case, demonstrations of class against class’, and emphasized that those 
involved were part of the ‘petty-bourgeois Left’.104 
Conclusion
Peace campaigners in Britain had long challenged the ‘taint’ of communism, 
which had been regularly raised in the popular press and in mainstream politics 
since the late 1940s. By the early 1960s, however, there was a broad cooper-
ation between communist and non-communist peace campaigners under 
CND. By this time, as Marc Selverstone has demonstrated, anti-communism 
in Britain was diminishing somewhat.105 This lessening of anti-communist 
furore meant that active participation, although not leadership, by CPGB 
members was, to an extent, acceptable. The shift in attitudes towards CND 
by the Communist Party also coincided with a peak in support for partici-
pation in CND’s large-scale protests but also a change in tactics with the 
group’s increased use of direct action from 1961. Other authors have argued 
that this amounted to a loss of popular support which was caused by the 
CPGB’s increasing influence over CND.106 But this does not mean that 
CND’s slump was caused by any virulent anti-communist agenda (although 
Jodi Burkett has shown that in 1962, CND was still declaring ‘we are neither 
the Conservative Party nor the Communist Party’).107 It is more likely 
that CND ran out of steam as a pressure group and extra-parliamentary 
movement, exacerbated by the split of the Committee of 100 over the issue 
of direct action and CND strategy.108
In the early 1950s the peace movement was represented in the mainstream 
press with a mixture of anti-communist sentiment and disdain. Throughout 
the decade, coverage changed firstly towards bemusement and then a 
certain level of acceptance, which helped CND to achieve a higher level 
of popularity than earlier movements. The aim of total, if not unilateral, 
nuclear disarmament received tenuous approval in the popular press despite 
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an undercurrent of suspicion about the perceived influence of intellectuals, 
communists, and non-conformist clergy within the peace movement. Even 
though both Labour and Conservative governments tried to manipulate 
public opinion against the peace movement, the media were, as the 1950s 
progressed, increasingly less likely to portray it in a wholly negative light. 
By the late 1950s, when the Aldermaston marches were reported as the 
‘greatest’ mass gatherings ‘since VE Day’, it became impossible for the press 
to ignore the popularity of the peace movement, which went beyond the 
communist-dominated oddities they had depicted earlier in the decade.109
Since the late 1940s the British peace movement had been disparaged by 
claims that it was a front for communist subversion. However, as we have 
argued, the movement actually worked in parallel to the communist-led BPC 
and the non-communist PPU (and other groups) for most of the 1950s. From 
its formation in 1949 until the invention of the H-bomb, the BPC was the 
most active organization within the peace movement and it was easy for the 
mainstream press, and the government, to dismiss the entire movement as a 
communist front, even though the PPU attempted to garner attention for the 
non-communist sections. Following the testing of H-bombs by the US in 
1954, however, nuclear disarmament gained in popularity and the press were 
divided over whether this hostility to nuclear weapons was still a communist-
dominated phenomenon or whether a broader grassroots movement was 
forming. At the same time, the Communist Party was unwilling to cooperate 
with some other parts of the peace movement and worked in parallel with 
other peace campaign groups. By the time of the establishment of the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, opposition to nuclear weapons was a 
persistent and popular narrative and its activist networks were usually clearly 
outside communist influence – particularly as the CPGB was hesitant to 
fully support the CND’s unilateralism and ‘middle class’ politics. The irony 
is that by the time the CPGB warmed to CND, the organization had already 
reached a mass audience with a message based on cross-class cooperation over 
concern about thermonuclear war. The CPGB had missed its opportunity to 
provide leadership to the movement. 
Of the non-communist peace organizations, CND was able to succeed 
while the PPU faltered for several reasons. CND benefited from emerging 
in the late 1950s, when the intensity of the early Cold War anti-communist 
narrative had diminished. The PPU had struggled to distance itself from 
accusations of communism and historical association with appeasement 
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from the 1930s. Alongside this, CND’s message that Britain should provide 
worldwide leadership by destroying its nuclear arsenal was patriotic, whereas 
the PPU often denounced the bipolarity of the Cold War.110 Moreover, CND’s 
objective of nuclear disarmament was much more popular and realistic than 
the PPU’s demand to end all war in any circumstances. Nevertheless, CND 
did build on the disarmament campaigns of the PPU and the BPC, which 
predated the thermonuclear era beginning in 1954. CND was able to mobilize 
a significant section of the British public behind nuclear disarmament. 
Overall, CND benefited from emerging in a period of the Cold War 
when anti-communist sentiment had lessened to a degree (assisted by the 
rise of the New Left following the events of 1956 and a reassessment by 
the government of the political ‘threat’ of the CPGB).111 This grassroots 
progressive movement could operate without the automatic ‘taint’ of 
communism. Moreover, people were mobilized against the use of nuclear 
weapons by continuing anxieties amongst many sections of the British 
population over the potential for thermonuclear war between east and 
west. CND’s position of unilateral disarmament was a simple notion that 
most peace campaigners could rally behind and proved more realistic than 
those proposed by the PPU and the BPC. These two organizations had 
dominated the peace movement in the early 1950s, but by 1960, CND had 
become its popular face, eclipsing the anti-communist/communist divide 
which had plagued the movement for the previous decade. This negation 
made CND the first single-issue mass movement in post-war Britain.112 
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